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Modern Medical and Surgical Means 
for the Preservati9n of Life 
Thomas J. O'Donnell, S. J. 
TH.E EXTENT of the obligation to use modern medical and�urgical �ccl:niqucs for t_hc preservation of life is to be sought 
. 
m the prmcrples govcrnrng the use of ordinary and cxtraor­
chnary means of preserving life. To construct the context of the 
problem we should consider the following truths, drawn from both 
reason and revelation. 
Reason· 
Because complete dominion in a substaucc necessarily implies 
the subordination of the ultimate end of the object of such 
dominion to the ultimate end of its subject, it is evident that man 
docs not have complete and perfect dominion over his own 
substance. 
· In other words, complete and perfect dominion in the sub­
st ancc of a thing implies the right to use that thing as a mere 
means to one's own end, even to the extent of destruction of the 
thing. This in turn implies a subordination of the end of such an 
object to the end of the possessor of such dominion. 
And because- man's ultimate end is subordinate to God alone, 
it is only God who has perfect and complete dominion over the 
humari substance. lHo·rcover the very nature of man's subordina­
tion to God postulates a certai1; imperfect and incomplete 
dominion of man in his own substance. It is thus from the nature 
of things that an administrative or useful dominion in one's own· 
substance exists for man as· a right, and is exercised by him as 
a duty. 
Revelation 
Moreovc{· we learn from divine revelation that the span of 
rn:m's lif� 011 earth is conterminous with the period of probation, 
filial servitude, and supernatural merit; all of which arc intimately 
co 1�nected with man's ultimate purpose of existence, and all o·f 
winch place the termination of the life-span outside the competence 
of the human will. 
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Conclusions 
The fundamental dynamism of life im
plies a process of con­
tinual breaking down and building up,
 an expenditure and rcstoru­
, tion of energy, an attrition and rep
air of the cellular syst:111,
which make certain forms of neglect ta
ntamount to self-destruction.
Thus it is evident that the refusal of 
the cYc�·yda�' 1�1cans o
f
sustaining life, such as nutrition, 1:cst, 
and rela
_





a self-destruction which clearly v10latcs
 the d1vmc domm1on o, ct 
human life. 
On the other hand the common consen
t of mankind clearly




is li�e at 
all costs. The ultimate dissolution of the su
bstance rs hkcw1se a
pa1·t of nature. 
These extremes are quite simple. It is in that n1s
t area between
that the real problems lie. These problems shoul
d be�ome clear
as we inspect and attempt to evaluate first, tl_
1� classical �oral
opinions on the subject, secondly the modern wnt111gs
, a_
nd thirdly
try to formulate some working principles drawn p
artially from
both of these sources. 
Standard Authors 
St. .Alphonsus Liguori sums up the 1'.iornl <_
>ptnton ?f th� six­
teenth and seventeenth centuries regardrng tins qu
cst10n with a 
reference from the ·Moral Theology of the Jesuit, Paul
 Laymann.
Laymann's work was the most popular of the seminary 
texts for
many years. It had appeared about a century before St. 
.Alphonsus
wrote. 
.Alphonsus quotes Laymann as teaching that no 01'.c i� 
held to
extraordinary and very difficult means to preserve hrs h
fe, such
as the amputation of a leg, etc., unless his life be necessa
ry for
the common good. Alphonsus then adds that this is the co
mmon
opinion to be found in the current moral treatises, and ref
ers to
the Jesuit., DeLugo, the Dominicans Soto and Bannez, and to
 the
secular priests Tournely and Sylvius, together with the Salm
anti-
cc11scs of the Canuclitcs, as holding the same opinion.
1 It is
significant to note here that while St. Alphonsus speaks 
of
"extraordinary and very difficult means, for example, the amp
u­
tation of a leg,":! and refers to DeLugo, among others, as th
e
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somcc of his cloctri11c, DcLugo himself does not presuppose the 
extraordinary difficulty of an amputation, as Alphonsus seems to 
do. Regarding the question DcLugo says that a person, "should 
permit that cure when the doctors indicate it as necessary, and 
when it can be done without intense pain," but he contraindicates 
the amputation, "if it would be accompanied by very intense pain, 
because no one is obliged to use extraordinary and very difficult 
means to preserve his life ... "3 
This is significant, because when Palmieri, writing a strictly 
Liguorian l\loral Theology, but a gad-fly at checking Alphonsus' 
references, deals with the passage in question ( from Liguori's third 
book), he retains the example of the leg amputation, but adds, "if 
the pain is very great."4 
The same caution is not characteristic of Bucceroni. In the 
1914 edition of his work we find the same common doctrine--the 
absence of any obligation to use what he calls "exquisite remedies 
which cause great pain, for example, the amputation of a leg." 
And then apparently feeling that the amputation example is 
becoming a bit threadbare, having been in constant and exclusive 
use since the six.teenth century, he adds another example of a 
remedy which causes great pain: "the incision of the abdomen to 
n;move a stone."" 
This consecrated vocabulary of ."remediis extraordinariis" 
which cause -"dolores acerbos," "accrbissimos," or "ingcntcs"; the 
examples being "abscissio cruris"; and now also, with Bucceroni, 
"incisio vcntris ad extrahendum calculum" looks even more 
anachronistic in the 1925 edition of Ferreres' Moral Compendium.0 
The medical world was aware of the fact that Augustus of Poland 
had sustained an amputation under total narcotic before 1782, 
and by 1900 the science of anesthesia was well on its way to per­
fection. Yet the 1928 edition of Colli-Lanzi is still excusing ampu­
tation because it "indicates very horrible sufferings" ( cruciatus 
a trociores), 7 and when we find the same "abscissio cruris" and 
"incisio ventris ad extrahendum calculum" as "media extraordi-
11aria et valde difficilia" in the 1944 edition of Aertnys-Damen,8 
the whole concept suggests an insufficient adaptation to current 
medical developments. 
On the other hand, before 1898 Doctor Capclllllann had 
reviewed the standard authors in his 111 edicina l'astoralis very 
I 
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much as we have <lone here, and observed that it was certainly "of 
some moment" that very difficult opcrat.io11s could be performed 
without pain, thanks to chloroform, and that if one were to sp:a� 
of the post-operative pains, "these generally arc not so vcr1 d1ff1-
cult, and for the most part arc less severe than t.hos
_c winch the 
illness, which made the operation necessary, wo�1ld bnng on: and 
the sick lllan would have to bear these even ,nthout tl�e opcra­
f "o Even at this carlv date Dr. Capcllmann respectfully sug­
;::�� that the theologians.might do well to modify their o
_
pinions.10 
1-Ie also points out that even in his day the danger of ma.ior ��)�ra­
tions has been considerably lessened by the use of more efficient 
antiseptics.1  
The modifications which Capellmann suggest.eel arc found m the 
1883 edition of KoniD's.1
2 In other cases the development was 
more gradual. Notice 
0
the following treatment of the questions as 
found in the 1922 edition of Noldin: 
There is 110 obli()"ation to undero-o a serious surgical operation 
0 0 
. f or a notable amputation: even though today _
the pams o 
many operations are not acute, due to anesthetics, neverthe­
less the oblicration is not to be imposed, both because many 0 
. u have a great horror of it and because the success, cspccrn Y 
the lasting success, ordinarily i
_
s un�crtain an� finally he.
c��sc 
it is a o-ravc incommodum to h,·c with a mutilated bod). 0 . • 
Curiously enough, to bolster this opinion Fat her N o
_
lc�m gl\·cs 
11 reference to the Ycry section of Dr. Capcllmann's 11/ellicinct l'as­
tvralis which we have referred to above. 
When we come, however, to the 1941 edition of Xolclin-Schrnit.�, 
we find that somewhere along the line there has been a drastic 
revision of the earlier opinion : 
Today the suffering is vastly decreased through narcotics, tl
'.
e 
dan()'er of infection is very remote, and 111oreo,·cr, success 1s 
mor: frequent and assured, and even for amputated mcn1bc'.·s 
there are artificial limbs-and therefore at least where cert.am 
daiwer of death would very probably be arnidcd through an 
ope;ation it does not seem that it can be called an cxtraor-' . . 
I f ·t H dinary means, unless there is great sub.1 cctive 10rror o 1 · 
In spite of all this one can still find, in the Jonc-Adcllllan 1948 
edition, the apodictical and unqualified assertion that "n�ithcr is. . I t· "1 ·• anyone obli<Tcd to undcrO"O a ma.ior surg1ca opera 1011. . o 0 
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Modern Authors 
would seem much more reasonable to h�ke a clue from DeLugo's In general the modern authors follow the standard moralists 
in agreeing that a m�n is obliged to take the ordinary means to 
preserve his life, but is not obliged to the extraord_inary means, 
unless some clement of the common good· enters iu. All agree that 
means which would inrnlve excruciating pain, danger of death, 
excessive expense, or great subjective repugnance are to be classi-
, 
HH.h Disputation, where we find the ideas of "common" and "which 
· 111cn commonly use" juxtaposed with "ordinary."20 In somewhat
the same vein Healy, in his ,1/ oral. Guidance, defines extraonlinary
• ' as that which is "beyond the ordinary power of rnen"; and while
fied as extraordinary. 
But all this was clearly delineated in the sixteenth century. 
\\'hen the real question arises; namely, are the advances of 
modern medicine in general to be classified as ordinary or extraor­
dinary means; and in particular, what is to be said of modern 
surgery, X-ray treatments, vVangensteen tubes, oxygen tents, iro11 
lungs and intrnYenous feeding-the moderns go riding madly off 
111 all directions. It will be to our advantage to discuss two of the 
more clearcut approaches to the problem. 
Extraordinary Identified With Artificial 
After repeating the standard principle on ordinary and 
extraordinary means, Lehmkuhl had strongly implied that ordi- t
nary means arc to be identified with normal everyday eating, drink­
ing, and sleeping. JU ,�i'c find this same implication in the Jone-
Ir\delmitn llloral 'J'heology,1T and in The Ccitholic Doctor,18 by 
Bonnar. l\Iorcovcr, Father J oscph McAllister, of the Catholic 
Univc1·sity, positively asserts the identity of ordinary and natural 
n1ea11s in his Ethics. The ]Jassagc is quoted as a summary of this 
opinion regarding ordinary and extraordinary means. 
.... a person is bouud to use only the ordinary means of 
]Jrcscrving his life. This includes proper diet and exercise 
and relaxation and sleep and all the natural aids which by 
its constitution the body needs to keep well. A surgical 
operation is not such a natural aid. It may not be against 
nature but it certainly is not a provision of nature for man's 
welfare. In this sense it remains unnatural and extraordinary 
und u person is not obliged to undergo it ... 10 
To follow the opinion of those authors wh� consider artificial 
means, by that very fact, to be extraordinary would seem to lead 
to a position that appears untenable. Such things as aspirin and 
alka-scltzcr would appear to become extraordinary remedies. It 
granting that an operation without anesthetic would be extraordi­
nary, adds that "today, ho\\·evcr, anesthetics remove all such pain, 
and so ordinarily (he) would be bound to have the opcration."'.! 1 
:Moreover, although we must definitely note and remeu1ber for 
future consideration that there is a valid distinction between 
natural and artificial means-as the comparison of an intravenous 
injection with a chocolate bar makes evident-the artificial is not 
to be considered as wholly distinct from the natural. 
Artificial Not Wholly Distinct From Natural 
The advances of modern medical science are due fundamentally 
to the development of the natural potentialities of civilized man 
livi11g in society, with each generation building on the discoveries 
and achievements of the last, as is evidently in accord with the 
rational nature of man. Thus it is inauspicious to say that 
surgery, intravenous feeding, radio therapy, and the like are 
extraordinary because, in themselves, artificial. For thev arc not 
rightly considered in themselves, but rather should be viewed rn 
their historical context. 
Just as the life of the individual advances and develops m 
complexity and perfection according to its natural potentialities, 
so, in the divine plan, a civilization or a culture develops. Thus 
what is extraordinary in one stage of cultural or scientific develop­
ment may be quite ordinary in another-in much the same way as 
the swinging stride of a mature man is his ordinary means of 
locomotion, but it would have been quite extraordinary for him at 
the age of two weeks. 
Example-Intravenous Feeding 
To treat each udvam·e of modern medicine in detail would 
require the dimensions of a book. As a fairly typical example we 
will consider the question of intravenous feeding. The conclu­
sio11s will be applicable, ·11111tntis •,nufa11dis, to many of the other 
modern medical uncl surgical advances and techniques. 
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Donovan, Sullivan, a11d Kelly would classify i11travenous feed­
ing as an ordinary means of preserving life. The rudimentary 
case with which they deal is put down simply as that of a man 
dying, whose life can be prolonged for several weeks by intra­
venous injections. 
Father Joseph Donovan says that in this case intravenous 
feeding must be considered an ordinary means, and that to stop it 
would be equivalent to mercy killing. 22 
Both Father Kelly and Father Sullivan allow that the means is, 
at least in itself, ordinary; but they likewise allow circumstances 
wherein it could licitly be discontinued. In this way they bring 
clearly into the light a further refinement of the basic principle. 
Father Kelly, writing in Theological Studies, says: "I agree 
with Father Donovan that intravenous feeding is, in itself, an 
ordinary means. But even granted that it is ordinary, one may 
not immediately conclude that it is obligatory. . . . To me, the 
mere prolonging of life in the given circumstances �eems to be rela­
tively useless, and I see no sound reason for saying that the 
patient is obliged to submit to it."23 
Father Joseph Sullivan, in his Catholic Teaching on the Moral­
ity of �uthanasia, while likewise allowing that intravenous feeding 
is al1 ordinary means in itself, adds to the case the circumstance 
of great pain which can be alleviated only briefly due to drug 
toleration, and says that intravenous feeding is, however, an arti­
ficial means, and that in such a case it could be considered extraor­
dinary and be discontinued. 24 
It is extremely important to notice that both Father Kelly 
and Father Donovan consider intravenous feeding, in itself, to be 
an ordinary means of preserving life, yet in certain cases both 
would sanction its discontinuance--Father Kelly, because "the 
mere prolonging of life in the given circumstances seems to be 
relatively useless," and Father Donovan because "an artificial 
means of preserving life may be an ordinary means or an extraor­
dinary means relative to the physical condition of the patient."2j 
Proposed Solution 
In the quotations just cited from Father Kelly and Father 
Donovan it appears that each of them has pried a little more 
deeply int.a the basic principle than anyone else since DeLugo's 
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time. Each of them is giving reasons why means which arc ordi­
nary in themselves may be discontinued under certain circum­
stances. While their reasons appear to be different, the word 
J "relative" is the key word in each quotation. And I propose that 
the word "relative" is the key word to the whole problem. 
Let us begin with the fact that we have a valid concept of what 
I we call a "finis absolute obtinendus." ,ve speak of ends which 
absolutely must be achieved, at any cost-and we might define 
f such an end as a good that is so essential to the very nature of 
man that it is either the ultimate encl itself, or so necessary a 
means to that ultimate end that no effort or cost could be con­
ceiYcd which would be proportionate to the loss of such a good. 
Examples would be beautitude or supernatural charity. 
But the very concept of a "finis absolute obtinenclus" postu- · 
!ates the concept of a "finis relcitive obtinendus." This, in turn,
we might define as a good which, according to right order, must .
lie sought with that amount of effort and cost that is to Le .
reckoned to be in proportion with the actual contribution of the
good, once obtained, to the totality of man's nature. and the
pmsuit of his ultimate end.
No one would classify the preservation of human life as a 
I "bonU1n ab$olute obtine.ndmn." It is therefore, a "bonwin relative
oblinenclum." Granting that the preservation of human life is a 
gootl which is to be obtained relatively-our question is precisely 
this, "relatively to what?" 
To answer this question we must ask another. vVhat, pre­
cisely, is the meaning of human life, as such, in the present cosmic. 
dispensation of Divine Providence? In other words, why, ulti­
mately, must human life be preserved? 
,�re have already seen that man cannot positively and volun­
tarily terminate his life span. But, moreover, man must preserve 
his life because it is the fundamental natural good which Goel has 
gi,·en man, the fundamental context in which all the other goods, 
which God has given man as means to the end proposed to him, 
must be exercised. 
Therefore the meaning of "relativity" in the preservation of 
life seems to be the relation of a due proportion between the cost 
and effort required to preserve this fundamental context, and the 
potentialities of the other goods that still remain to be worked out 
within that context. 
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If we now formulate a definition of ordinary mcm1s from· thr 
opinions and arguments just reviewed, and take this definition 
as a common denominator for working out cases on this formula 
of relativity, we should have what we set out to find in this study­
that is, the grounds for the ultimate moral judgment. in most 
cases. It is to be noted that what we arc looking for here is not a 
new definition of ordinary means, but rather a dC'finition drnwn 
from the critical evaluation of the standard authors. And using 
this definition in conjunction of what we hope is a clearer delinea­
tion of the relativity involved, we must not expect to find a "moral 
slide-rule" which will automatically answer cases, but rather tltc 
ultimate grounds for the necessary moral judgment. 
Summary 
l. Ordinary means might best be defined as those which arc
at hand and do not entail effort, suffering, or expense bcyoncl 
that which men would consider proper for a serious undertaking. 
according to the state of life of each individual. 
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l<'irst, there is the danger that such an attitude could be con­
strued in the minds of others as a sort of "Catholic Euthanasia." 
It is the same caution, for the same reason, that advises prudence
1 in treating of periodic continence--lest the charge of "Catholic 
bil'th-control" be incurred in a misintcrpl'ctcd sense. 
Secondly, and more important, there is in the medical profes­
sion today an ideal which demands the fighting off of pain and 
death until the last possible morrient. It is safe to say that many 
of the great advances in mo<lern medicine, as well as a perfection 
in skill and technique, have been due to what might have frequently 
been called a "useless prolonging of life." If, for example, modern 
sul'gcry is an ordinary means of prescn·ing life, it is only so 
because of its extensive use in those stages of its development when 
it was an extraordinary means. This consideration bears directly 
• on the common goo_d. Father Kelly warns of a defeatist attitude
which would "turn back the clock" of medical progress, and we 
must not be too ready to risk a lowering of the medical ideal and 
a retardation of medical progress in the immediate interests of 
individual cases.
1 DeLiguori, 'l'heoloyia l\IoraUs, L. III, n. 372. 
2 ibidem: "mediis extraordirrnriis et nimis duris, v. gr. abscissione cruris."
3 DeLugo, De .J11re et .lusl·itia, Disp. IO, n. 21.
2. Apart from subjective considerations of pain, expense, or
personal abhorrence ( which classic authors generally use as partial 
criteria of extraordinary means) most of the commonly available 
techniques of modern surgery and medicine should be classified as 
ordi'nary means of preserving life. 
J 
3. The use of these developed tcchniq'ucs is to be distinguishccl
from the every day actions of eating, drinking, and sleeping. 
! Ballerini-Palmieri, Opus 'l'heol. Mornle (1890), ml. 11, p. 6H.
5 Bucceroni 'l'heol. Morali.•, 6th ed., (19H) vol. I, n. 715-716. 
u Ferreres, Com.p. 'l'heol. Morcdis, 18th eel. (192,5), rnl. I, p. :H9. 
, Colli-Lanzi, 'J'heol. Mo1·alis, (1928), vol. Ill, n. 1654. 
4. These developed techniques need not be used in some cir· 
cumstanccs. The relation of their use to the remaining potentiality 
of what we have culled the "fundamental context of human life" 
should be the basis of the moral judgment as to whether such t 
modern medical means must he used or not. In those cases wherr 
obligation to use such means is contrnindicated, the means might 
be considered as "relatively extraordinary." 
A Word of Caution 
One fUl'thcr consideration should be added, in the form of a 
caution. VVe must not be too ready to terminate either ordinary 
or extrao1·dinary means of preserving life, even though in itself 
such termination would be morally justified �n a given case. Thi, 
for two reasons: 
S Aertnvs-Damen, '1.'heol. Morr,lis, 15th ed. (1944), vol. I, n. 566. 
u Capelimann, ll{edicina Pci.•toralis, 5th ed. (1901), p. 2-t
10 ibidem
11 idem, p. 20.
11 Konigs, Theoloyia il1orr,li.,, 5th ed. (1888), n. 463, ad 3 (earliest arnilahlc at
ti111e of present writing). 
13 \"olclin, S11rnrnc1 'l'heol. illoralis, 1 Hh eel. (Hl22), \'OI. 11, n. 82h.
II \"oldin-Schmitt, idem, 27th ed. (1941), vol. II, n. 325.
15Jone-Adelman, Moral 'l'heolof/.'I, (1948). English translation and adaptation
from the ninth German edition.
JG Lehmkuhl, 'l'heol. lllorali.•, 10th ed. (1902), vol. I, n. 571-572.
17 op. c·it. n. 210.
rs Bonnar, 'l'he Catholic Dortor, 2nd eel. (1941), p. 96. 
rn :'lkAllister, Ethics, (1947), p. 206. 
�o op. di. Disp. XVI, n. 152. 
11 Henh·, Moral G'l/.ida11ce, (19,12), p. 162. 
11 Homiletic rr11cl PcrBloral Review, XLl X, August 19�9, 90 -i. 
�3 'J.'h.eoloyi<·al Studies, XI, June 1950, 218. . , . 14 ,J. V. Sullivan, Catholic 'l'eachi11,q on the Jlornhl.'f 11/ Jrntlw,wsm, Catholic 
t·nivcrsity, Stu<lies in Sacred Theology (19-rn), p. 72. 
�;; 1111. cit., p. 65. 
